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I. Introduction 
This paper provides an overview of progress achieved to date on the objectives set out in the 
Global Europe Communication and draws a number of conclusions for defining the EU's 
future trade strategy. It responds to requests made in the public consultation on the EU's new 
trade policy, where it was suggested that the new trade policy should start from an evaluation 
of the Commission's present strategy. 
The Global Europe Communication in 2006 defined the key competitiveness-related elements 
of the EU’s trade policy pursued by the first Barroso Commission. It set out an integrated 
approach, linking the internal and external aspects of the EU’s competitiveness. It stated that 
Europe should pursue internal policies that promote the EU's external competitiveness. 
Competitiveness is determined fundamentally by productivity growth and the evolution of 
costs. Many factors and domestic policies are key determinants of competitiveness. Trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) can also play a major role in this regard inter alia by 
promoting a more efficient use of EU economic resources, transfer of technology, providing 
cheap intermediate inputs and access to fast-growing markets abroad. Global Europe called 
for the EU to remain open to trade and investment, advocating greater openness and fair rules 
in other markets.  It also underlined the importance of sustainable trade by incorporating 
provisions relating to labour standards and environmental protection in new trade agreements. 
Global Europe recognised that openness is no longer simply about tariffs. Core aspects of the 
EU’s internal market are intrinsically linked to its external negotiation agenda. Securing real 
market access in the 21st century means focusing on new issues and developing the tools of 
trade policy to achieve the types of openness that make a real difference. Global Europe 
advocated taking greater account of the external impact of the EU’s internal policies, and, in 
particular, their impact on Europe’s competitiveness. These internal drivers of 
competitiveness were also reflected in the negotiation objectives of the Commission’s 
multilateral and bilateral external agenda under Global Europe, which included tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers as well as rules-based areas such as public procurement, services and 
investment, access to resources and energy, intellectual property rights (IPRs), competition 
policy, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), and sustainable development.  
In operational terms, Global Europe’s main innovation was that, while reaffirming the EU’s 
commitment to the multilateral system and the Doha Round, it ended the de facto moratorium 
on launching new free trade agreements (FTAs). As a result, a series of more economically-
orientated negotiations were launched with Korea, India and ASEAN in 2007 and Canada in 
2009. Negotiations with Mercosur were re-launched in 2010. Priority was also given to other 
important economic partners (e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC) with whom the 
Commission has been negotiating FTAs. It should be kept in mind when evaluating progress 
on Global Europe that trade policy is a slow delivery process that requires careful planning: It 
takes about five years to launch, complete and implement FTA negotiations and more for 
multilateral negotiations.  
Based on this analysis, Global Europe proposed eight specific areas of action, progress on 
which is assessed in the following sections: 
1. The WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA)  
2. Launch of new competitiveness-driven FTAs 
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3. Transatlantic trade and competitiveness 
4. China  
5. IPR enforcement 
6. Renewed Market Access Strategy 
7. Public Procurement 
8. Review of the Trade Defence Instruments 
This is not an exhaustive list of all EU trade policy priorities or activities during the Barroso I 
Commission. The Global Europe Communication had sought to focus on the subset of trade 
policy initiatives that would be most relevant for this overarching external competitiveness 
objective. Several important trade policy instruments in their own right, such as the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), were deemed less important for the EU's own 
competitiveness. Consequently, Global Europe did not cover at length issues such as the 
important contribution that EU trade policy makes to sustainable development in developing 
and least developed countries (LDCs), the promotion of human rights and labour standards, 
whether through unilateral trade preferences or within the Economic Partnership Agreements.  
Given the importance of the contribution trade policy can make in these other areas, the 
current report will also cover briefly the progress made on this front since 2006. 
II. Progress achieved to date on the areas identified by Global 
Europe 
1. Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
The Global Europe Communication stated that a strong multilateral trading system was the 
most effective means of increasing and managing trade for the benefit of all. It identified the 
successful conclusion of the DDA as the EU’s top priority. Following the launch of Global 
Europe, the Commission with its WTO negotiating partners made good progress in the Doha 
Round, bringing it close to a conclusion on modalities in the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
July 2008. However, trade ministers were unable to reach a final agreement on all details to 
be included in the package, and further negotiations were required.
1
  
The main single issue that prevented WTO members from reaching an agreement on the Doha 
Round modalities in July 2008 was the special safeguard mechanism that developing 
countries could use in the event of a significant surge in imports of agricultural products. 
However, from the second half of 2008 onwards, the main obstacles were tied to external 
factors, such as uncertainty over the consequences of the economic crisis on various sectors in 
WTO member economies, which prompted policy makers to take a more defensive stance. 
                                                 
1
 Modalities refer essentially to the specific numerical targets, various flexibilities and other parameters that 
would define specific commitments (tariff cuts and reduction of agricultural subsidies) WTO members would 
need to undertake on industrial and agricultural products as part of the Doha negotiations. In other areas on the 
DDA agenda (various WTO rules and further liberalization of trade in services, for instance) negotiations are 
less advanced.   
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Elections and changing governments in some key WTO members also led to re-positioning in 
the negotiations.  
There is currently a lack of clarity regarding the level of ambition needed to make a Doha 
Round agreement acceptable to all parties. WTO Members therefore need to reach a general 
understanding on key issues of ambition, balance and reciprocity before engaging in further 
negotiations to address the outstanding issues. This is likely to require high-level political 
guidance. It is still possible to conclude the Doha Round in 2011, provided that WTO 
members have the political will to fully engage in the negotiations. Agreement among the 
G20 members will be key in this respect. 
Trade is an essential part of any strategy designed to boost long-term growth and employment. 
As a multilateral initiative, the Doha Round has by far the greatest potential for creating new 
opportunities for exports and improvements to welfare. A strong multilateral trading system 
can also deliver considerable systemic benefits to European businesses, who will find it easier 
to take long-term decisions on the basis of stable and predictable trade rules. Therefore, 
Europe has made significant contributions to the Doha Round negotiations with a view to 
reaching an economically ambitious, but development-friendly multilateral trade agreement. 
For instance, the DDA draft modalities, which are recognised as a basis for negotiations, 
foresee inter alia minimum average cuts of 54% and 38% to EU bound tariffs for agricultural 
and industrial products, respectively, and to reduce its overall trade distorting subsidies for 
agriculture by 80%. The EU has also forcefully argued for more liberalisation in services, and 
for substantial reductions in non-tariff barriers. 
The benefits of a rules-based multilateral trading system were clearly demonstrated during the 
financial and economic crisis. Thanks to WTO disciplines and peer pressure among WTO 
members, with a few exceptions, borders were maintained as open as before the crisis and 
trade remained "part of the solution" to the global crisis. However, the global economic crisis 
has also shown with greater clarity that existing WTO disciplines on issues such as 
government procurement and sectoral subsidies have proved to be inadequate. This clearly 
points to the need to ensure that the WTO system and multilateral trade rules become well-
equipped to deal with important trade policy issues for the future.  
2. Launch of new FTAs 
2.1 Overview 
Global Europe applied new economic criteria to the launch of FTAs, focussing on partners 
with high market potential (economic size and growth) and significant economic benefits 
from removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers (e.g. due to high existing barriers). Potential 
interaction or conflicts with the EU’s multilateral (WTO) agenda and other countries’ 
negotiations were also taken into account. This led to the launch of FTA negotiations with 
Korea (in ratification process), India (potential to close by early 2011) and ASEAN countries. 
Following the slow progress made under the pure region-to-region approach with ASEAN, 
negotiations now progress on a bilateral track. Negotiations are underway with Singapore and 
there is increasing momentum to progress with other countries. Canada is the latest country 
with which FTA negotiations are underway, launched in summer 2009.  
In addition, a number of other types of negotiations (e.g. Mercosur, GCC) predate the launch 
of Global Europe. Several ongoing bilateral trade negotiations are are not covered by the 
Global Europe approach. Nonetheless, they have an important role to play in achieving the 
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objectives set out in Global Europe. The two annexed tables show the scale of our trading 
relations and of the trade deals currently negotiated, based on current trade levels.  
2.2 Korea 
Negotiations with South Korea were launched in May 2007. After eight rounds of talks over 
two and a half years, the negotiations were successfully concluded and the FTA was initialled 
in October 2009. The legal instruments to apply and implement this FTA were agreed with 
the Council in September 2010 and are currently under discussion with the European 
Parliament. The objective is to have the agreement provisionally applied in mid-2011.
2
 
The EU-Korea FTA is the first FTA the EU has negotiated with an Asian country and is the 
most comprehensive free trade agreement negotiated by the EU so far. It will eliminate 98.7 % 
of duties in trade value for both industry and agriculture within 5 years. The remaining 
portion of tariffs will be almost entirely eliminated over longer transitional periods, with the 
exception of a limited number of agricultural products. In addition, sectoral annexes on 
electronics, motor vehicles and parts, pharmaceuticals, medical devices and chemicals have 
been negotiated to tackle non-tariff barriers. The FTA contains separate chapters covering 
trade remedies, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs and 
trade facilitation. The Agreement includes also a chapter on services, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) pre-establishment, e-commerce and the related schedules of commitments, 
which go significantly beyond both parties’ commitments under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and comply with Article V GATS. There is also a chapter on 
Current Payments and Capital Movements.
3
 
The FTA provides for far reaching commitments to rules governing competition, including 
state aid, intellectual property, enforcement and public procurement. It also incorporates 
stronger and binding horizontal provisions on regulatory transparency concerning mutual 
trade and investment. 
The FTA also includes a dedicated protocol on cultural cooperation, which sets a framework 
for policy dialogue and exchanges regarding cultural activities. This includes setting up an 
implementation structure that is independent of the FTA, notably a separate committee and a 
specific dispute settlement mechanism. Lastly, a comprehensive Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapter covering social and environmental issues was negotiated, providing an 
important benchmark for future FTA negotiations. This chapter contains a number of 
substantial provisions to ensure compliance with relevant domestic legislation and 
international agreements, sets out areas for potential future cooperation and establishes a new 
monitoring mechanism involving civil society through a Civil Society Forum. 
The EU-Korea FTA opens up a fast growing East Asian market for EU exports. According to 
available estimates, the EU will improve its position in several industries (chemicals, 
machinery, other manufactured and food products) as well as in specific services (e.g. 
                                                 
2
 The FTA complements a revised framework agreement for EU-Republic of Korea’s relations which was signed 
in May 2010. 
3
  See for instance "EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement: 10 Key Benefits For The European Union", December 
2009, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ 
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business, insurance and transport services).
4
 This FTA is an ambitious agreement, which can 
be used as a benchmark for future FTA negotiations. 
2.3 India 
Concluding an ambitious agreement with India remains a key priority. The EU is India’s most 
important trading partner but exports from the EU to India remain below potential, amounting 
to just 2.5 % of total EU exports in 2009.  
Negotiations were launched in June 2007 and nine rounds have been held since. The shared 
ambition is to conclude negotiations swiftly. An ambitious FTA is estimated to provide 
considerable economic benefits to both parties.
5
 However, a few key issues are still 
outstanding including tariff negotiations, where coverage still needs to be improved, public 
procurement and services, where both sides aim to create substantial new market access, 
including in mode 4 services trade. Trade and sustainable development is also proving a 
challenging subject where significant progress is still required. 
Other areas where both sides still need to find a way forward include intellectual property 
(including geographical indications), regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers, such as 
Technial Barriers to Trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and sectoral 
non-tariff barrier (NTB) issues. 
At present, India enjoys relatively good market access for goods to the EU under the GSP. In 
turn, India maintains fairly high tariffs and some peaks in areas particularly important to EU 
industry (such as cars, wines and spirits) and significant non-tariff barriers in other sectors 
important to EU exporters. Like in other bilateral negotiations, the different level and profile 
of existing trade barriers at the outset of the negotiations is a challenge. 
2.4 ASEAN 
The ten ASEAN countries
6
 as a group are the EU’s third largest external trading partner, with 
two-way trade in goods and services amounting to some € 175 billion in 2008. EU exporters 
of manufactured and agricultural goods and service providers in many sectors see significant 
growth opportunities in the dynamically growing ASEAN markets, many of which are 
currently protected by high tariff and non-tariff barriers. Following Member States’ 
authorisation to negotiate, ‘region-to-region’, FTA negotiations with a group of seven (out of 
ten) ASEAN countries were launched in 2007. Until March 2009, nine negotiation rounds had 
been held. However, progress in these region-to-region negotiations was slow, and both sides 
agreed to put negotiations on hold in March 2009. One difficulty in the region-to-region 
negotiations arose from significant structural differences within ASEAN, which meant that 
existing levels of liberalisation and negotiation objectives differed widely among countries in 
the group. 
In December 2009, EU Member States gave the green light for the Commission to hold FTA 
negotiations with individual ASEAN countries. The purpose of these bilateral FTAs is to 
                                                 
4
 For further details on the economic benefits estimated to arise from the EU-Korea FTA see, for instance, “The 
Economic Impact of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union and Korea”, available online 
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146174.pdf 
5
 See for instance the “Economic Impact of a Potential Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and India” 
(April 2007), available online at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/chief-economist/. 
6
 Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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serve as building blocks for the long-term objective of an agreement within the regional 
framework. The preliminary assessment of an ambitious FTA between the EU and ASEAN 
points to significant economic benefits and a boost in the GDP growth rate in ASEAN 
countries.
7
 Negotiations with Singapore, which focus strongly on services and non-tariff 
barriers, began in the spring of 2010 and have already created incentives for other ASEAN 
members to follow suit. FTA negotiations with Malaysia were launched in October 2010 and 
Vietnam has also given a political signal that it is ready to engage in bilateral FTA 
negotiations. There is also some interest in other ASEAN countries, such as in Thailand and 
in Indonesia, where a Joint Vision Group has been established. The door remains open for 
other ASEAN countries to join. It is ultimately for the ASEAN countries to make their own 
assessment and express their readiness to engage in a comprehensive FTA with the EU. 
2.5 Canada 
Negotiations with Canada on a ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement’ (CETA) 
were launched in May 2009. Given that Canada is economically the most developed partner 
with which the EU has been negotiating a trade agreement so far, it is the understanding of 
both sides that, in order to succeed, the process needs to achieve a high degree of 
liberalisation, not only in goods, but also in services, investment and government procurement.  
The negotiations also need to lead to an agreement that is very comprehensive in scope and in 
coverage of regulatory issues. These objectives must be achieved whilst fully upholding and 
operationalising the shared principles of sustainable development. 
The first round of negotiations took place in October 2009. During the first three rounds, it 
was generally possible to considerably narrow down the differences to the key issues where 
the positions of both sides diverged most, and on which the negotiators now focus. No 
specific chapters have yet been closed, but the discussions are very advanced in certain areas. 
Both sides anticipate finalising the negotiations in 2011.  
Based on the economic criteria for new FTAs set by Global Europe, Canada forms part of a 
second tier of countries immediately following those identified as priority partners. The 
country has the fourth highest GDP among the EU’s trading partners and is of strategic 
importance for EU industry, not only because of its natural resources but also because of its 
strong capacity in research and development. In addition, Canada is the fourth largest investor 
in the EU (by inbound FDI stocks). In line with other FTAs with developed economies, 
around half of the gains for the EU are expected to derive from liberalising trade in services 
and another 25 % from full tariff elimination. Additional positive effects will arise from the 
opening of provincial procurement markets to European operators and from enhanced 
disciplines in areas such as intellectual property rights or competition.
8
 Furthermore, 
Canadian trade is highly focussed on its NAFTA partner the United States. There are thus 
potential gains for EU industry from competing with US exporters on a more level playing 
field. 
                                                 
7
 For a CGE analysis of a comprehensive FTA between EU and ASEAN see the “Economic Impact of a 
Potential Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and ASEAN” (April 2007), available online at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/may/tradoc_134706.pdf 
8
 For a comprehensive economic analysis of the EU-Canada trade potential see the joint study “Assessing the 
costs and benefits of a closer EU-Canada economic partnership”, carried out by the Government of Canada and 
the European Commission, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_141032.pdf 
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2.6 Mercosur 
Mercosur was identified as a priority objective by the Global Europe Communication. FTA 
negotiations between the EU and Mercosur were launched in 1999, but stalled in 2004. They 
were re-launched in May 2010, following an informal dialogue during which Mercosur and 
the EU gave concrete indications regarding their readiness and willingness to negotiate an 
ambitious FTA. The negotiations are of great economic interest to the EU, due to the high 
tariffs applied in Mercosur, which is the EU's 8th largest trading partner, and the high amount 
of EU investment in the region. Key factors for a successful negotiation include Mercosur's 
ability to meet EU expectations for a high level of ambition and the EU’s ability to table a 
sufficiently attractive offer on agricultural market access. 
After a first round of negotiations in July in Buenos Aires and a second one scheduled in 
October in Brussels, both sides are committed to conclude these negotiations without delay.  
2.7 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
The GCC is the second largest regional grouping with which the EU is engaged in FTA 
negotiations. The GCC region is composed of six high per capita income countries with 
strong demand for a range of products from high value-added goods to agricultural products. 
The GCC is a major energy supplier to the EU and thus key to the EU’s energy security. 
Negotiations on a comprehensive FTA covering trade in goods and in services, investment, 
public procurement, intellectual property rights, competition, technical barriers to trade, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as well as trade facilitation have been ongoing since 
2002, when the GCC countries created a customs union. By 2008, agreement had been 
reached on most negotiation chapters. Talks have nonetheless been suspended since 
December 2008. The main outstanding issue is the treatment of export duties under the FTA.  
2.8 Russia 
As the EU's third largest trading partner, Russia continues to be a key strategic partner. A 
deepening of EU-Russia trade relations would have positive economic effects on both parties. 
Following adopting the Global Europe Communication, negotiations began in 2008 on a new 
bilateral agreement between the EU and Russia to replace the current Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement. The aim regarding trade and investment is to achieve a more 
effective, stable and predictable trading environment and to seek closer integration where 
possible. However, the negotiations on the trade and investment provisions are proceeding 
extremely slowly. Recently Russia has shown renewed engagement in its efforts to join the 
World Trade Organisation, which had been delayed and complicated by the customs union 
between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The Commission is working closely with Russia in 
order to achieve accession to the WTO as soon as possible. 
The EU-Russia bilateral trade relations have been rendered more problematic since the 
introduction by Russia in 2009 of extensive protectionist measures, including tariff increases. 
Although the measures were presented as a temporary reaction to the global economic crisis, 
the tariff increases were eventually consolidated in a new common external tariff with Belarus 
and Kazakhstan as part of the creation of a customs union. As the main trading partner of the 
three countries, the EU bore the brunt of the impact of this decision. By the end of 2009 
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Russia was responsible for around 75% of all EU exports facing increased border protection 
worldwide.
9
  
2.9 European Neighbourhood FTAs 
The Commission has continued negotiating with countries in its neighbourhood (the 
Euromed/ Eastern Partnership area). These negotiations provide partner countries with the 
perspective of bilateral Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) as part of 
framework Association Agreements. The EU is the leading trading partner for nearly all of 
these countries. DCFTAs can support the socio-economic development of these countries by 
underpinning domestic reforms and enhancing partial integration with the EU’s internal 
market for trade in goods and services. To meet these goals, DCFTAs should be negotiated 
only with countries that are already members of the WTO, and once they are ready to 
negotiate and sustainably implement the consequent commitments. Building on WTO 
membership, an intermediate objective is to have in place the new generation of bilateral 
agreements, including DCFTAs, and to ensure that the partner countries have made very 
substantial progress towards alignment to the existing trade acquis. In 2020, and in view of 
the requests already made by our ENP partners, a close review should be made to decide on 
the first group of countries with which we could either start negotiations on limited accession 
to the EEA, or establish a sort of ENP-EEA. Building on WTO membership, an intermediate 
objective is to have in place the new generation of bilateral agreements including DCFTAs, 
and to ensure that the partner countries have made very substantial progress towards the 
alignment to the existing trade acquis. 
Negotiations with Ukraine began in spring 2008. For Armenia and Georgia, negotiating 
directives were adopted in May 2010 and both countries are addressing a set of key 
recommendations to improve their administrative capacity, legislation and implementation in 
a number of critical trade areas. Only when the two countries have made sufficient progress in 
implementing these recommendations, the Commission will propose launching negotiations 
on the DCFTA part of the Association Agreements. A preparatory process aiming at assisting 
Moldova in meeting the necessary conditions for the start of the DCFTA negotiations is also 
ongoing, while in this case negotiating directives are still to be prepared and adopted. Neither 
Azerbaijan nor Belarus are covered by any preparatory process at this stage as their 
accession to the WTO is still pending.  
In the Euromed area, trade relations with Mediterranean partners are governed by a set of 
Association Agreements in the context of the Barcelona Process, which mainly cover trade in 
goods. The network of Association Agreements is likely to be completed in 2010, with Syria 
as the last piece. These agreements are being completed by negotiations covering trade in 
services and the right of establishment, dispute settlement and agriculture. The EU-Euromed 
partnership is complemented by South-South economic integration, which the EU strongly 
supports. Initial successes include the Agadir Agreement (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and 
Egypt), which came into force in 2007, and the free trade agreements concluded by Israel and 
Turkey with other Southern Mediterranean partners
10
.  
                                                 
9
 Lucian Cernat and Nuno Sousa “The impact of crisis-driven protectionism on EU exports: The ‘Russian doll’ 
effect”, 9 January 2010, available online at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4464 
10
 Israel has concluded FTAs with the Palestinian Authority, Turkey and Jordan. Turkey has concluded FTAs 
with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, the Palestinian Authority and Israel 
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Though Libya is not formally part of the Euromed area, negotiations on a Framework 
Agreement between the European Union and Libya, including a deep and comprehensive free 
trade area (DCFTA), were launched in November 2008.  
2.10 Latin America 
Two additional FTA negotiations with Latin American countries have followed a region-to-
region approach, with varying degrees of success. While they mainly focused on development, 
both provide for a high degree of liberalisation, not only for goods but also for services and 
investment. They also contain provisions to tackle non-tariff barriers through regulatory 
convergence and trade facilitation, and provisions on IPR (including geographical indications), 
trade and competition, good governance regarding taxation and a whole set of rules on 
sustainable development.  
The Association Agreement with six Central American countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and El Salvador) was concluded in May 2010. In March 2010, 
negotiations for the Multi-Party Trade Agreement (MPTA) with Peru and Colombia were 
concluded successfully, while negotiations with Ecuador are still pending and uncertain in the 
case of Bolivia. 
The Central American FTA and the Colombia and Peru MPTA highlight both the benefits and 
drawbacks of the region-to-region approach. On the one hand, if successful, as with Central 
America, it gives EU industry access to a larger market under consistent conditions and it 
enhances intra-regional trade for the partner country. On the other hand, the regional partners 
often represent relatively loose groupings (compared to the EU), that sometimes find it 
difficult to coordinate and agree on common positions. Complex intra-group dynamics can 
lower the level of ambition as negotiating partners settle for the lowest common denominator. 
In these cases, introducing a bilateral dimension to the negotiation can yield better results, as 
demonstrated by Colombia and Peru. 
2.11 Economic Partnership Agreements 
The EU has also made great efforts in negotiations towards Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with ACP11 countries, with the primary objective to foster development 
by providing them with preferential access to the EU market, in compliance with WTO rules, 
and by improving economic governance and supporting regional integration. The state of play 
of the EPA negotiations can be summarised as follows: 
• The EU-Caribbean EPA was signed in October 2008 and provisionally applied from 
December 2008 (when the WTO waiver to the EU's system of unilateral preferences 
under the Cotonou Agreement ended). The CARIFORUM region includes 15 countries: 
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Haiti signed the Agreement 
on 10 December 2009. The EPA is not yet applied by Haiti pending its ratification, which 
has been delayed due to the earthquake in early 2010. 
• Apart from the Caribbean, negotiations on a comprehensive agreement were not 
completed with any other regional group before 2008. The EU therefore negotiated a 
                                                 
11
 A group of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries_en.cfm 
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series of interim EPAs to maintain and improve their access to the European market and 
to ensure compliance with WTO law. These agreements are:
12
  
o Central Africa: An agreement with Cameroon (other countries in the region 
finally decided not to join the interim agreement but to carry on with full EPA 
negotiations). The agreement with Cameroon was signed in January 2009. 
o East Africa (EAC): A regional agreement with the East African Community 
(Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi) was initialled in 2007 but has 
not yet been signed. 
o Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA region): A regional agreement with Comoros, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe (but with individual 
market access schedules). Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe 
signed the agreement in August 2009.  
o Pacific: A regional agreement with Papua New Guinea and Fiji (but with 
individual market access schedules). Papua New Guinea signed the agreement in 
July 2009 and Fiji in December 2009. 
o Southern Africa (SADC region): A regional agreement with Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Mozambique and Namibia. All but Namibia signed the interim 
agreement in June 2009.  
o West Africa: The agreement with Ivory Coast was signed on 26 November 2008. 
The European Parliament approved it in March 2009. An agreement with Ghana 
was initialled in 2007 but has not yet been signed. 
Since the interim EPAs were signed, some headway has been made in all regions in 
discussing the comprehensive regional agreements, though progress is mixed. In some regions, 
the Commission plans to give negotiations a final push to conclude in 2010, but in others the 
negotiations will continue beyond this year. 
2.12 The ‘Global Europe’ Issues in FTA negotiations  
Overall, the FTA negotiations launched under the economic criteria defined by Global Europe 
have made good progress. Nonetheless, progress on some negotiating objectives beyond 
tariffs set out by Global Europe has been more mixed. These objectives, which were 
identified as crucial for securing real market access in the 21st century, included non-tariff 
barriers, access to resources and energy, services and investment, intellectual property (IPR), 
public procurement and competition policy. 
On non-tariff barriers, the Korea FTA is a good reference point for future agreements, 
especially where tariffs are low but significant regulatory barriers remain. The FTA includes 
sectoral annexes on electronics, motor vehicles and parts, pharmaceuticals, medical devices 
and chemicals to tackle non-tariff barriers. The FTA also contains separate chapters covering 
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trade remedies, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), 
customs and trade facilitation.
13
 
Services continue to be a key part of the EU economy and an area with potential to increase 
overall EU exports. At the same time, access to imported services supports the EU industry’s 
competitiveness, since three quarters of services imports are inputs for other activities.
14
  
Progress has depended largely on individual negotiation dynamics. While improved market 
access for services providers is a key active interest of the EU, its scope for offering trading 
partners access to its own market could still be improved by a deeper integration of the EU’s 
internal market for services.  Nevertheless, the commitments on market access for services 
included in the Korea FTA go significantly beyond both parties’ commitments under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The same applies also to the agreement 
with six Central American countries.
15
 Similar levels of market opening are targeted in other 
ongoing Global Europe FTA negotiations, especially with Singapore and Canada.  
Further progress in extending services trade liberalisation, including regulatory aspects, will 
require a close interface between Single Market policies for services and, on the external front, 
agreement on specific conditions to be met on a case-by-case basis, ensuring a certain level of 
approximation of rules and regulatory systems. 
Concerning the raw materials supply strategy, the Commission has compiled an inventory of 
existing export restrictions imposed by trading partners, which will be updated on a yearly 
basis.
16
 Disciplines on export restraints were tabled in various negotiations, bilateral and 
multilateral. Notably, a full ban on export restraints was included in the EU-Korea FTA. 
Export restraints are also the principal remaining obstacle towards conclusion of an FTA with 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This highlights the Commission’s commitment to limit 
harmful export restraints and ensure that the policy on raw materials is consistent in different 
trade agreements. Finally, the Commission has lodged a complaint with the WTO's Dispute 
Settlement Body against China in relation to its export restrictions on various raw materials. 
Provisions on energy production, transportation and price distortion are included in 
agreements with resource-rich countries and strategic energy transit countries, such as the 
ongoing FTA negotiations with Ukraine and Libya, the new agreement with Russia, as well as 
WTO accessions. 
The Global Europe Communication also calls for stronger provisions on competition in FTAs 
to ensure that European firms do not suffer in third countries from subsidies to local 
companies or anti-competitive practices, which can have similar effects to more traditional 
trade barriers. The Commission has thus consistently advocated including binding rules on 
competition and state aid rules in FTA negotiations following Global Europe. The Korea FTA 
makes major advances in competition policy, particularly concerning subsidies. This is 
particularly significant as it contains provisions that prohibit the most distortive types of 
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subsidies.
17
 In addition, the agreement contains transparency provisions according to which 
the parties must report annually on the total amount, types and sectoral distribution of 
subsidies. Similar provisions on transparency of subsidies can also be found in the FTAs with 
Central America and Colombia & Peru. 
Following the Global Europe Communication, the Commission has also developed a 
comprehensive approach to trade and sustainable development, i.e. cooperation in areas 
related to decent work, labour standards, environmental protection and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, accompanied by a monitoring mechanism involving social partners, NGOs 
and other stakeholders. A relevant chapter has been included into the FTA with Korea and 
since then the Commission has continued including it systematically into other negotiated 
FTAs. This approach has been appreciated by the European Parliament and other stakeholders. 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) and public procurement are assessed in sections 5 and 7 
below.  
3. Relations with the United States  
The main Global Europe results have been the establishment of the Trans-Atlantic Economic 
Council (TEC) and resolution of two important disputes over beef hormones and bananas. 
Nevertheless, the TEC has yet to realise its full potential. Its success and the US’ engagement 
are likely to be agenda driven, but disputes (notably Airbus-Boeing, but also poultry and 
GMOs) may complicate the EU-US trade dialogue. However, the percentage of trade covered 
by disputes (less than 2 %) is very small. Following the Global Europe agenda, cooperation 
with the US has been stepped up in areas such as jointly addressing market access and IPR 
enforcement issues with China and Russia. 
The TEC, which was launched in 2007 by German Chancellor Merkel, US President Bush 
and Commission President Barroso, is the political body that oversees and deepens economic 
integration between the EU and the US. The main objectives are to (i) achieve greater 
coherence of EU and US regulation to improve conditions for business and tackle (potential) 
non-tariff barriers to trade and investment and (ii) discuss strategic and economic issues in 
relation to third countries. The ultimate aim is to create an integrated transatlantic marketplace. 
The TEC provides a high level forum to give technical cooperation projects the necessary 
political momentum to accelerate progress. The TEC Framework covers issues such as 
regulatory cooperation, investment, intellectual property rights, innovation, secure trade and 
financial markets. Although the TEC was for a long time bogged down in its – largely 
unsuccessful – attempts to set up a transatlantic dispute settlement body, it should become a 
powerful mechanism to enhance EU-US economic cooperation.  
The TEC is the bilateral EU-US high level forum in which economic issues can be discussed 
in a systematic and coordinated manner. It is therefore a key element of the EU’s 2020 
strategy. However, it is noteworthy that, overall, more progress has been made on regulatory 
and other non-tariff issues under the FTA negotiations than under regulatory dialogues 
outside the FTAs, such as those with the United States and Japan. One reason is the EU’s very 
limited scope to make regulatory changes, which implies that concessions have to be made in 
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other negotiation areas. Cross-cutting compromises are not possible when negotiations focus 
solely on regulation.
18
  
Alternative solutions, such as increased use of mutual recognition and international standards 
(where available) should thus be explored, particularly in relations with large partners, such as 
the United States and Japan. This may also require flanking measures under EU Internal 
Market legislation to ensure consistency with such international agreements. 
4. China  
Global Europe recognised China as, simultaneously, an opportunity, a challenge, and a 
prospective partner for making globalisation work for jobs and growth. While irritants have 
continued to affect the EU-China relationship, a long-term partnership with China is more 
important than ever. Notwithstanding the trade deficit, China has become be the fastest 
growing market for our exports of goods and services and an important destination for EU 
investment, increasingly contributing to the global competitiveness of European firms.  
Since 2006, significant work on specific barriers has been undertaken. A number of barriers 
were addressed in the context of the global market access strategy, notably improving the 
situation for innovative products developed by foreign pharmaceutical companies. Pressure 
from the EU and others led Chinese authorities to slow down or change initiatives that would 
have worsened the conditions for European business in key areas such as government 
procurement and in the ICT sector. Disputes brought to the WTO with regards to financial 
information services and car parts were successfully resolved, and in the absence of progress 
on China’s export restrictions on raw materials, the EU decided to take the issue to the WTO 
in June 2009. 
Negotiations on a range of trade issues continue in order to update the 1985 trade agreement 
as part of a broader Partnership and Cooperation agreement. However, there is a clear gap 
between China's and the EU's ambitions, and negotiations are progressing with difficulties. 
A significant development since Global Europe has been the establishment of the EU-China 
High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HED). The creation of a broad platform 
encompassing all key economic and trade issues has given the relationship a boost. Due to its 
level (Vice Premier) and significant participation and buy-in from key Chinese Ministers and 
European Commissioners, the Dialogue holds significant potential as a key component in 
managing the bilateral economic relationship to provide real political impetus in strategic 
matters and to resolve irritants.  
The key objective for the EU is to ensure that China returns to a path of reforms and creates a 
true level playing field for foreign economic operators, while addressing systemic issues (e.g. 
rebalancing the economy and overcapacity fuelled by subsidisation). In the short term, this 
requires increased focus on a number of areas. One is investment, including whether 
investment negotiations could potentially increase market access. Another is procurement 
where it is essential to ensure better reciprocity. China's accession to the GPA is a key priority 
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for the EU. IPR remains another priority area where stronger enforcement and cooperation on 
patents will be critical for European interests and the problems faced by the EU's innovative 
companies in China. Also the question of Chinese standards will be in focus to ensure 
compatibility with international standards.  
To this end, a number of new initiatives have been launched. These include negotiations on a 
bilateral cooperation agreement on the protection of geographic indications, a new IPR 
taskforce to address key issues for the future such as patent quality, enhanced customs 
cooperation on IP rights enforcement and a taskforce on investment to explore ways to foster 
bilateral investment cooperation.  
Furthermore, regulatory dialogues are in place in a number of policy areas (such as financial 
markets, public procurement and IPR) which address regulatory barriers and create useful fora 
to discuss new regulatory developments or other topics of mutual concern. 
Going forward, China is set to remain the biggest opportunity and a challenge for EU trade 
policy. China continues its rapid development as now the second largest national economy in 
the world and the EU’s second biggest trading partner. Not least at a time when other 
economic centres in world struggle to lead the global economy forward, it is essential for 
Europe to be part of this development and to increase our economic cooperation with China. 
5. IPR protection and enforcement in third countries  
In the knowledge economy, European companies (and other right holders) rely heavily on 
intellectual property rights (IPR) to compete effectively in third-country markets. For their 
part, as they develop, emerging economies increasingly benefit from the growth in research, 
innovation and investment that IPR brings. Therefore, the protection and enforcement of IPR 
was addressed under the Global Europe agenda. Progress was made notably through the 
enhanced implementation of the Strategy for the Enforcement of IP Rights in Third 
Countries adopted by the Commission in 2004. 
Since the adoption of Global Europe, the Commission has stepped up its work in this field, 
through a number of initiatives: 
a) negotiating IPR provisions in bilateral trade and other agreements. For example, 
the Korea, Peru, Colombia and Central America FTAs include detailed provisions on 
effective protection and enforcement of IP rights. A similar approach is being followed in 
ongoing FTA negotiations with India, Mercosur and Singapore and in non-preferential 
cooperation agreements with China and Russia; 
b) inclusion of geographical indications (GIs) in all trade agreements – IPR chapters for 
all relevant FTAs contain provisions for effective protection and enforcement of the EU's 
policy on GIs; 
c) negotiating with a group of like-minded countries
19
 the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), to tackle the growing international trade of IPR-infringing goods. ACTA 
will focus on cooperation between enforcement authorities, adoption of best practices and 
more effective legislation standards;  
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d) monitoring the implementation of the IPR clauses included in existing FTAs to 
ensure that EU right-holders are properly protected abroad; 
e) reinforcing specific ‘IPR dialogues’ with certain key partners, such as China, Russia 
and Ukraine and launching new ones with Argentina and Mexico, to tackle specific problems 
raised by EU right holders. In the particular case of China, the Commission intensified its 
cooperation with the Chinese authorities in areas of particular relevance to European industry 
in the context of the EU-China IP Working Group and also in areas of mutual interest, such as 
by creating an IPR Task Force on patent quality. A China IPR SME Helpdesk was also set up 
to help European SMEs protect and defend their IP rights in the country
20
; 
f) promoting the debate on IPR enforcement, often in cooperation with the US, Japan 
and Switzerland at the World Trade Organisation’s TRIPS Council; 
g) expanding technical assistance initiatives to third countries with enforcement and 
providing support in particular to EU small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating 
in these countries;  
h) promoting IPR in other international fora, such as the G8, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Intellectual Property Organisation, the 
World Customs Organisation, the World Health Organisation and other United Nations 
agencies;  
i) ensuring that the international IPR framework is fully compatible with, and actively 
contributes to, the promotion of essential innovation-related areas such as public health, 
biodiversity protection and climate change; 
j)  engaging in customs cooperation on IPR enforcement with our main trading partners 
such as the US, China and Japan. 
In order to re-define its priorities, the Commission recently launched the 3rd Survey on IPR 
protection and enforcement in third countries. Like the previous surveys concluded in 2003 
and 2006, this consultation of stakeholders will allow the Commission to re-assess the main 
trade-related IPR problems for European right-holders and to update its list of ‘priority 
countries’.    
Lastly, in 2010, an evaluation of the 2004 Strategy for the Enforcement of IP rights in Third 
Countries was launched, to ascertain whether any adjustments are necessary. Notwithstanding 
the results of the study, which will be available before the end of the year, one issue to take 
into account in the revised Strategy is IP protection, to ensure that enforcement and the legal 
framework corresponds to future needs, in technological and economic terms.   
6. Renewed Market Access Strategy  
A major and visible aspect of Global Europe has been the renewed Market Access Strategy 
(MAS), a new cooperation initiative in Brussels and on the ground in key markets between 
the Commission, Member States and business to address the key barriers that hold back EU 
trade. Many non-tariff barriers to exports were identified by Member States and business 
associations as among the most harmful obstacles to trade. In sectors like the agri-food sector, 
they not only add to the cost of trade but they can even close markets entirely. They range 
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from discriminatory taxes on drinks in India and the Philippines to unnecessary inspection 
requirements in Ukraine, restrictions on exports of hides and skins to India, and textile 
labelling requirements in Egypt. Member States can now systematically communicate a 
consistent message in their contacts with third countries, ensuring that the EU speaks with one 
voice. The progress achieved in dealing with individual barriers under the MAS is testament 
to the importance and legitimacy of trade policy.  
The Market Access Strategy helps European companies, including SMEs, access third country 
markets by providing information on market access conditions (free online Market Access 
Database — MADB: www.madb.europa.eu) and removing market access barriers. The new 
strategy has led to many concrete results where barriers were removed, in over 30 cases in 
2009 alone.
21
 
Operational implementation of the strategy includes: 
• Setting up appropriate structures: The partnership structure involving the Commission, 
Member States and business has worked very well and is crucial to the success of the 
MAS.  
• Prioritisation: Identification of 203 key barriers for 32 main export markets. These barriers 
are constantly updated and constitute the main benchmark for future MA action. 
Crisis-monitoring: Thanks to the existing MAS structure, the Commission was able to provide 
crucial input for the WTO and G20 initiatives to prevent protectionist backlashes following 
the financial crisis. Six crisis monitoring reports were provided as input to the WTO 
monitoring process and to the crisis-related barrier removal action plan. The reports helped 
develop a shared analysis of the situation and mount peer pressure against protectionism. 
The MAS has thus become an important pillar of EU trade policy, alongside the negotiating 
agenda. The Europe 2020 strategy provides further impetus for the MAS, namely an annual 
trade and investment barrier report on ‘identifying ways to improve market access and 
regulatory environment for EU companies’. 
7. Public Procurement  
The potential global welfare gains from more competitive public procurement markets remain 
substantial. Government procurement accounts for 16 % of EU GDP and can be as high as 20-
30 % in developing and emerging countries. Hence, access to public procurement markets not 
only provides new market opportunities for EU businesses, but it also gives tendering 
authorities better value for tax payer’s money by widening the scope of eligible bidders. 
One focal point has been the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), where the 
EU’s proposals to extend the membership and the coverage (entities and services) of the GPA 
have so far made little progress. Except for Taiwan, which joined the agreement in 2009, no 
new members have joined since 2006.  
In parallel, the Commission addressed this issue in Global Europe and subsequently 
convinced several trading partners to include government procurement chapters in FTA 
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negotiations since 2006, including rules on market access and transparency. Substantive 
provisions on public procurement were included in the EU-Korea FTA, the EU-Iraq PCA and 
in the agreements with Central American and the Andean Community countries. In the case of 
Korea, the FTA opens to EU suppliers Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts (e.g. large 
infrastructure projects, such as toll motorways and bridges) from all central and sub-central 
entities committed by South Korea under the GPA. 
Work on public procurement has mainly focused on FTA negotiations, where this remains a 
sensitive area for many partners. One of the factors behind this limited progress was the 
openness of the EU procurement market, which has the side effect of limiting the incentive 
for negotiating partners to offer reciprocal access to their own market for EU operators. The 
comparative openness of the EU market led the Commission to introduce in Global Europe 
the idea of a dedicated instrument to obtain better negotiating leverage in countries where the 
EU sees its own access curtailed. At the time, however, there was limited support among 
Member States for adopting this approach and a specific instrument has not yet been put in 
place.  
This problem has become more acute during the economic crisis and the recent adoption by 
some key trading partners of ‘buy local’ provisions. The Global Europe experience and the 
Commission’s ongoing efforts suggest that one approach could be for the EU to consider 
taking a more robust stance with trading partners whose markets remain closed to EU 
suppliers, in a bid to trigger momentum and engage our trading partners in this area.  
8. Review of the Trade Defence Instruments  
Global Europe called for an update and modernisation of the trade defence instruments (TDI), 
started by a Green Paper at the end of 2006. However, lack of consensus among Member 
States has stalled the process since the end of 2007. A number of practical improvements to 
bring greater transparency to the Commission’s work were nevertheless agreed in summer 
2009, including new on-line case information.  
Despite the TDI reform being postponed, the Commission, Member States and stakeholders 
have identified transparency as an aspect of the EU’s TDI system to be improved. Thus, after 
intensive consultation, in mid-2009 the Commission and EU Member States agreed on ways 
to improve transparency in TDI. The measures proposed (e.g. a much greater range of up-to-
date information on the TDI website, specific assistance to SMEs, simplified TDI 
questionnaires, improved non-confidential files, improved disclosure to interested parties in 
TDI proceedings and an enhanced role for the Hearing Officer) can be taken without any 
legislative changes and are now being implemented. Full implementation is scheduled for 
early 2011. 
In addition, all key TDI aspects listed above have been integrated in a Total Quality 
Management strategy (‘TQM’), which encompasses a wide range of issues. The Commission 
is in regular contact with all stakeholders and is open to assessing the scope for making 
further improvements to existing trade defence instruments. To increase the general 
acceptance of the Commission’s trade defence instruments, they must be applied transparently 
and efficiently. There is also the multilateral aspect (Doha round) which must be duly taken 
into account in any reform — we must avoid our efforts being portrayed as unilateral 
disarmament.  
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Overall, the EU has been a moderate user of TDI since the start of Global Europe. Less than 
1% of the EU's imports are affected by TDI at any given moment. The measures used have 
targeted unfair practices by trading partners, while limiting any trade distortions (e.g. through 
use of the lesser duty rule).  
III. Conclusions and lessons learned 
Global Europe provided a clear vision for the role of trade policy in promoting the EU’s 
global competitiveness. Numerous respondents to the public consultation on the EU's future 
trade policy indicated that they considered Global Europe to have set the right priorities and 
focus, and that it remained to a large extent valid today. Global Europe underlined the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism and the Doha Round and launched a number of new initiatives, 
including bilateral FTA negotiations, new platforms for dialogue with Europe’s two largest 
trading partners, the United States and China, and cross-cutting initiatives on IPR, public 
procurement, TDI and market access.  
• The Doha Round made good progress following the launch of Global Europe, and WTO 
members came very close to reaching an agreement on key building blocks of a DDA 
package in 2008. However, the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 and changes to key 
WTO members’ governments have kept a successful conclusion of the DDA out of reach.  
• Meanwhile, the FTA negotiations launched under the economic criteria defined by Global 
Europe have made good progress. The signed EU-Korea agreements, as well as the 
agreements with Central America and Colombia/Peru provide benchmarks for future 
FTAs in terms of tariff elimination and coverage of many non-tariff barriers and 
regulatory issues, especially where tariffs are low but significant regulatory barriers 
remain. The FTAs also address issues such as trade and sustainable development. 
• In the field of transatlantic trade and competitiveness, the main Global Europe results 
have been the establishment of the Trans-Atlantic Economic Council (TEC) and 
resolution of two major disputes, beef hormones and bananas, the latter contributing also 
to the Doha Round and strengthening the multilateral trading system in general by solving 
the longest ever WTO trade dispute.  
• In the EU’s trade relationship with China, progress on updating the 1985 Partnership and 
Cooperation agreement (PCA) remains slow, but the annual High Level Economic 
Dialogue has rejuvenated the relationship. Overall, the EU-China trade relationship has 
continued to flourish and generate significant benefits for both partners. The main 
challenge for EU trade policy remains to ensure that the relationship is placed on a 
sustainable footing for balanced growth, which will require addressing a range of market 
access barriers and IPR problems faced by EU firms in China. 
• IPR enforcement under the Global Europe agenda has largely been addressed by bilateral 
negotiations as well as customs co-operation activities. The most visible IPR initiative at 
present is the plurilateral negotiation between developed countries of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).  
• The renewed Market Access Strategy under Global Europe has helped European 
companies access third country markets by providing information on market access 
conditions (MADB) and removing market access barriers. Individual successes are often 
  21 
small scale, but they have been numerous and each involves real businesses and jobs. 
Lastly, thanks to the existing MAS structure, the Commission was able to provide crucial 
input to the WTO and G20 initiatives to prevent protectionist backlashes following the 
financial crisis. 
• Progress on public procurement has focused on the Commission’s FTA negotiations, 
where it remains a sensitive issue for many partners. The EU’s level of openness 
sometimes reduces its counterparts’ incentives to reciprocate, despite the vast potential for 
savings for taxpayers by making public procurement markets more competitive. 
• Member States did not reach a consensus on the major reform of trade defence 
instruments (TDI) proposed by Global Europe. Instead, the Commission took steps to 
streamline its TDI procedures to optimise transparency and accessibility for EU industry 
and affected third-country firms. 
Notwithstanding the progress made since 2006 in accomplishing the Global Europe agenda, 
important experiences have been acquired and lessons learned, which will feed into the EU’s 
future trade strategy. 
The region-to-region versus country-to-country approach 
The Commission initially pursued a region-to-region approach in several FTA negotiations as 
a first-best option because of the advantages it brings for EU exporters and partner country 
industries and consumers. If successful, a region-to-region FTA provides EU industry with 
access to a large market based on consistent conditions and enhances intra-regional trade at 
the partner’s end. The Commission continues to pursue this approach, for instance in the case 
of the Mercosur and GCC negotiations. However, in other negotiations the regional 
counterparts sometimes represent groups that are substantially less integrated than the EU. 
Internal coordination and agreement on common positions among members is a constant 
challenge. Complex intra-group dynamics can lower the level of ambition as negotiating 
partners settle for the lowest common denominator. In these cases, a bilateral approach can 
often yield better results. This led the Commission to conclude bilateral trade deals with some 
Latin American countries and to re-launch negotiations with ASEAN countries on a one-to-
one basis, starting with Singapore. By aiming for consistency in each bilateral FTA, a 
subsequent consolidation of bilateral deals at the regional level remains possible and indeed 
desired. 
Improving leverage in trade negotiations 
The size of the EU’s market provides significant leverage in bilateral trade negotiations. At 
the same time, the EU is an open economy not only in terms of average tariff rates, but also in 
several non-tariff areas that are of substantial value to the EU economy, such as public 
procurement, services and investment. The same applies to certain provisions in the EU’s TDI 
regime, which can dilute enforcement outcomes compared to other jurisdictions. This 
openness generates substantial welfare gains for EU businesses, consumers and tax payers. 
However, already having an open market can reduce the EU’s leverage in negotiations as it 
reduces partners’ appetite to reciprocate. Any strategy to encourage trading partners to make 
further concessions (for example by threatening to temporarily reduce the EU’s level of 
openness) would need to be designed carefully, to avoid precipitating overall protectionist 
tendencies and welfare losses. The same can be said about the unilateral trade concessions 
through the GSP scheme for countries like India. Any top-level economic decisions must be 
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taken carefully because the costs and benefits of policy initiatives are borne by different 
stakeholders. A ‘tactical’ market closure decision may therefore turn out to be difficult to 
reverse in practice. 
The interaction between the internal and external dimensions of competitiveness needs to be 
reinforced 
Trade negotiations seek to generate the same types of welfare gains that underpin the EU’s 
internal market. Trade liberalisation with external partners can never go beyond the level of 
openness within the internal market. This limits FTA deals in areas where the internal market 
is not yet complete.  
Particularly in the field of services, new acquis and future initiatives to deepen the internal 
market would be extremely helpful in trade negotiations on services, where the EU often 
cannot move beyond binding its existing levels of liberalisation in FTAs, which in turn limits 
its ability to obtain improved market access for its own services industry. Initiatives such as 
the Services Directive provide new market opportunities to an industry which has become the 
cornerstone of the EU economy and an area of European comparative advantage with the 
potential to increase EU exports. At the same time, access to imported services supports the 
EU industry’s competitiveness. Any move to deepen the internal market for services would 
therefore also pay dividends externally.  
Other areas in which internal market rules can complicate access to external markets are 
rules-based negotiations, such as product standards and SPS. A greater readiness to accept 
international standards whilst preserving an equivalent level of protection could significantly 
strengthen the EU’s bargaining hand and help it secure new market opportunities for EU 
businesses. Conversely, the EU should step up its efforts to promote its own rules as a basis 
for international regulations. 
The need to tackle non-tariff barriers through deep and comprehensive FTAs and other 
bilateral mechanisms is reflected in the fact that virtually all EU trade agreements now cover 
non-tariff measures and beyond-the-border regulatory issues in various ways, from open-
ended regulatory cooperation projects to binding agreements on mutual recognition. A 
challenge for the coming years will be to find a way to more effectively tackle regulatory 
issues. This will again require careful consideration of internal and external market dynamics. 
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ANNEX 
Table 1: EU Trade with FTA/ bilateral negotiation partners (2009) 
 
  
Exports 
(Mio 
euro) 
% of total 
Trade 
Imports 
(Mio 
euro) 
% of total 
Trade 
Balance 
(Mio 
euro) 
Extra EU 1.094.519 100,0 1.199.266 100,0 -104.747  
MEDA (excl EU and Turkey) 69.489 6,3 49.469 4,1 20.020  
GCC 57.745 5,3 21.769 1,8 35.976  
ASEAN 50.201 4,6 67.844 5,7 -17.643  
India 27.486 2,5 25.387 2,1 2.099  
Mercosur 27.220 2,5 35.145 2,9 -7.924  
Western Balkan Countries 25.455 2,3 11.176 0,9 14.280  
Canada 22.431 2,0 17.777 1,5 4.654  
SADC 22.258 2,0 21.716 1,8 542  
South Korea 21.519 2,0 32.075 2,7 -10.556  
West Africa 19.224 1,8 16.900 1,4 2.324  
Ukraine 13.902 1,3 7.872 0,7 6.030  
Libyan 6.471 0,6 19.996 1,7 -13.525  
Andean Community 6.048 0,6 9.253 0,8 -3.205  
Central Africa 4.719 0,4 5.210 0,4 -491  
Cental Amer avec Panama 4.211 0,4 4.578 0,4 -367  
Easten and South Africa 3.610 0,3 2.722 0,2 888  
Caribbean 3.266 0,3 3.996 0,3 -730  
EAC 2.731 0,2 1.881 0,2 851  
Pacific 460 0,04 951 0,1 -491 
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) 
World excluding Intra-EU27 trade; European Union: 27 members. 
 
• Agreements marked with an asterisk are signed and in force. The South Korea agreement 
has two asterisks as it has been initialled, but is not yet adopted. Interim EPAs have been 
agreed with a number of partner countries, but only the Caribbean full agreement can be 
considered ‘adopted’ at this stage. 
 
• This table highlights the volume of negotiations in which the Commission is engaged and 
the fact that many agreements cover no more than 1-2 % of the EU’s external trade. As a 
reference for comparison, Table 2 shows the EU’s top 10 trading partners in 2009 (in 
goods). 
 
Table 2: EU trade in goods with main partners (2009) 
 
Total 
Trade (Moi 
euro) 
% of total 
Trade 
Exports 
(Mio euro) 
% of total 
Trade 
Imports 
(Mio euro) 
% of total 
Trade 
Balance 
(Mio euro) 
Extra EU 2.293.517 100,0 1.094.229 100,0 1.199.288 100,0 -105.059 
USA 364.002 15,9 204.468 18,7 159.534 13,3 44.934 
China 296.382 12,9 81.633 7,5 214.749 17,9 -133.117 
Russia 180.761 7,9 65.481 6,0 115.280 9,6 -49.799 
Switzerland 162.045 7,1 88.292 8,1 73.754 6,1 14.538 
Norway 106.167 4,6 37.515 3,4 68.651 5,7 -31.136 
Japan 91.790 4,0 35.947 3,3 55.843 4,7 -19.896 
Turkey 79.867 3,5 43.780 4,0 36.086 3,0 7.694 
South Korea 53.593 2,3 21.518 2,0 32.075 2,7 -10.557 
India 52.873 2,3 27.486 2,5 25.387 2,1 2.099 
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) 
World excluding Intra-EU27 trade; European Union: 27 members. 
